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Abstract
The article focuses on the negotiation of a new labour migration policy in
Germany in the years 2011 and 2012, and on the role that actors on both the
regional and the European Union levels played in encouraging the introduc-
tion of a more open labour migration framework. Up until now, research has
highlighted the German use of the European level for introducing more
restrictive changes in migration policy. In line with these precedents, during
the negotiation of a European policy for admitting highly-skilled migrants,
Germany advocated a restrictive framework. However, at the transposition of
the EU directive on highly-skilled migrants in national law, the German
government used the directive as an opportunity to introduce a paradigm
change in labour migration policies, establishing a significantly more open
labour migration policy hitherto exclusively associated with Anglo-Saxon
countries. The article will analyse the preconditions for this change, assessing
the value of the goodness-of-fit approach for understanding processes of
Europeanization.
Keywords: Europeanization, labour migration, highly-skilled migration, European
Union, federalism
１ The Europeanization of migration policies
( . . . ) We do not see any need for EU regulation at all. This question should remain
a national competence. There will be no directive on labour migration, since the
Bundesrat will not approve (Innenminister der Länder gegen Blue Card, 2007).
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With these words, the minister of the interior the federal state of Lower
Saxony commented in December 2007 upon the European Commission’s
project to introduce an EU-wide residence title for highly-skilled migrants.
However, five years later, the Bundesrat approved of the introduction of
the so-called Blue Card, even opting for a more liberal labour migration
framework than the European directive stipulated. Also, although Ger-
many was one of the member states that took a sceptic stance towards
the introduction of a common labour migration policy, the federal govern-
ment used the provisions of the directive to significantly liberalize the
German labour migration regime.
What happened between 2007 and 2012, and what can be learned about
the dynamics and the tensions of Europeanization from this case? These
are the questions that this article seeks to answer. At the same time, it aims
at addressing the ‘limited empirical foundation about European influences
on national immigration policies’ (Ette and Faist, 2007: 4). Compared to
other policy fields, the field of migration policies has been rather neglected
by research on Europeanization and on multi-level governance processes
in the European Union. This is partly due to the fact that harmonization in
the field of migration has only started comparatively late and is still weaker
than in other policy fields. It is common knowledge in migration research
that migration policies remain a central field of national sovereignty and
an area of competence of the nation-state (Bendel, 2011a; Ette and Faist,
2007). Migration is commonly held to be a policy area ‘where nation states
are least likely to cede control’ (Ette and Faist, 2007: 4). Thus ‘( . . . ) the
transfer of sovereignty from the member states to the European Union in
decisions about migration and asylum, justice and order, continues to be
one of the most surprising task expansions in the European project’ (Bend-
el et al., 2011b: 9).
Still, migration policies have gradually been integrated at the EU level
and since the late 1990s have been characterized by a ‘( . . . ) highly dynamic
legislative process’ (Bendel, 2011a: 371). Migration has become a field of
multi-level governance: ‘( . . . ) transnational co-operation in the fields of
asylum and migration has taken the characteristics of a multilevel govern-
ance regime in the sense that the relevant actors ( . . . ) can be found in
Brussels, in certain national ministries and central agencies, and at the
subnational level’ (Guiraudon, 2000: 257). A central characteristic of the
common migration policy is, however, that much policy-making in this
area has overwhelmingly focused on migration control policies and on
restricting migration to Europe: ‘Since the treaty of Maastricht 1993 (. . .)
the European immigration policy has basically developed emphasizing the
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dissuasive/exclusionary axis of its immigration policy’ (Gsir, 2013: 91). Only
since the year 2000, legal forms of migration and labour migration have
been addressed by European legal projects. However, whereas the harmo-
nization of migration control policies has significantly progressed, a further
integration of labour migration policies in Europe is met by the majority of
member states with a reluctance to give up national steering instruments.
At the same time, research points to the role of domestic factors in bring-
ing about a common European immigration policy. National governments
have used the EU in the field of migration as an arena for circumventing
national constraints, benefitting from operating in international venues
and thereby bypassing national constraints (Guiraudon, 2000). This ‘escape
to Europe’ (Geddes, 2003) accounts for a significant part of harmonization
in the field of migration.
At first sight, Germany seems to be an exemplary case of this escape to
Europe strategy. Research on the relationship between German domestic
migration policies and the EU has overwhelmingly shown the use of the
European level for introducing more restrictive migration policies. ‘Politi-
cal actors in Germany used developments on the EU level in order to
prepare the ground for a domestic policy change’ (Prümm and Alscher,
2007: 77). One of the most significant policy changes, the change of the
German basic law on asylum towards a significantly more restrictive fra-
mework in 1993, was made possible by a partial transfer of competence to
the EU. ‘This shifting of the asylum and refugee policy was a tactical man-
oeuvre by the liberal-conservative government in order to be able to over-
come the existing domestic asylum and refugee policy ( . . . ). Any conse-
quent change to the liberal asylum law in Germany was now no longer a
failure of German politics or the breaking of a taboo, but a consequence of
decisions at the European level’ (Hellmann et al., 2005: 152). The German
Länder, too, have used the emerging multi-level governance field on migra-
tion, although their objective was to prevent an increasing harmonization.
In the context of the ratification of the Maastricht treaty, the German
federal states’ co-determination rights in European matters were increased
by the introduction of the so-called Europe article in the German basic law.
Thus endowed with more political power and fearing growing financial
burdens following from the admission of asylum-seekers, they repeatedly
blocked attempts at introducing qualified majority voting, thus effectively
preventing a further European integration (Hellmann et al., 2005: 153).
However, the case of the negotiation of a new labour migration policy in
Germany goes contrary to these findings. The transposition of the “EU
Directive 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country
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nationals for highly-qualified employment”, the so-called Blue Card direc-
tive, entailing a further harmonization of migration policies, was not only
welcomed by federal and regional actors but led to an even more far-reach-
ing liberalization of German labour migration law than the directive stipu-
lates. As the OECD stated in its 2013 report on labour migration, ‘recent
reforms have put Germany among the countries with the fewest restric-
tions on labour migration for highly skilled occupations’ (OECD, 2013: 15).
In order to understand this surprising development, this article analyses
the development of the public discourse on labour migration and the
positions of key actors between 2010 and 2012, the timeframe in which
the EU Blue Card directive was supposed to be transposed, and the role
that the Blue Card directive played in this process.
In order to conceptualize the preconditions for the transposition of the
Blue Card directive into German law, the article uses the goodness of fit
approach. In initial research on the influence of the EU on the domestic
level, goodness of fit, a concept that will be outlined in more detail below,
was one of the most influential approaches for understanding the effects of
European policies on domestic settings. However, after its initial success,
the approach was increasingly criticized, some voices even arguing that it
should be discarded. Contrary to these positions, I argue that the concept
of goodness of fit still provides a valuable framework for understanding the
interaction of the EU and the national context in bringing about policy
change, and appreciating the preconditions for the Europeanization of
migration policies. Taking into account both institutional and actor-re-
lated factors and analytically linking the national and the European level,
this approach is able to capture the complexity of policy change in a multi-
level system.
In order to analyse the preconditions for the use of EU policies as a
motor for change at the domestic level, this article proceeds in three
steps. After outlining the main characteristics of the goodness of fit ap-
proach and the criticism that it has raised, it describes the development
of a common labour migration policy at the EU level. Then, by analysing
positions of key actors and the evolving discourse on labour migration in
the German context, the article argues that a trend towards a convergence
of policy aims between the EU and the German domestic context in the
field of labour migration took place. While up until now a “good fit” be-
tween the EU and the domestic context has been held to prevent major
policy changes, in my analysis I intend to show that in the German case it
was exactly the establishment of a state of goodness of fit that led to a
paradigm change in German labour migration policy.
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The analysis is based on a mix of qualitative methods: (1) Expert interviews
with the confederation of German employer associations (Bundesvereini-
gung Deutscher Arbeitgeber (BDA)); the Federal Ministry of the Interior,
Unit of Immigration Law (BMI 1, BMI 2 and BMI 3)１; the Federal Ministry of
Labour and Social Affairs, Department of labour market policy and em-
ployment of foreigners (BMAS 1); the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs,
Head of Unit of labour market policy and employment of foreigners (BMAS
2); the Ministry of the Interior of the free state of Saxony (SMI 1 and SMI 2);
the Ministry of labour of the free state of Saxony (SMA); the CDU/CSU
faction of the German Bundestag (CDU/CSU). (2) A qualitative content
analysis of articles on labour migration in the national quality newspaper
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ); coverage from 1 January 2010 to 31 December
2011. All articles were analysed that contained the keywords labour migra-
tion, (highly)-qualified workers (hochqualifizierte Fachkräfte), labour short-
age (Fachkräftemangel). (3) A document analysis of press releases and
statements of political parties, employer associations, trade unions, re-
search institutes and expert bodies on migration.２
２ The dynamics of Europeanization: The goodness of fit
approach
Europeanization has been defined as ‘the impact of ( . . . ) EU policy mea-
sures on the existing policies, political and administrative processes and
structures of member states’ (Héritier, 2005: 200). The term Europeaniza-
tion ‘( . . . ) is most often associated with domestic adaptation to the pres-
sures emanating directly or indirectly from EUmembership’ (Featherstone,
2003: 7). In order to understand processes of Europeanization that take
place by the transposition and implementation of EU directives, an expla-
natory model that has been widely used is the goodness of fit (Risse et al.,
2001) hypothesis. Originally formulated by Duina (1997), the goodness of fit
hypothesis holds that ‘( . . . ) smooth adaptation to EU policies depends on
the degree to which these fit existing national policies and institutions’
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006: 332). The original idea holds that the
implementation of EU directives is determined by two nation-specific in-
stitutions: the organization of interest groups and policy legacies, i.e. na-
tional legal and administrative traditions: ‘Implementation has depended
on the relationship between directives and the institutions it targets. When
a directive has demanded major transformations in these institutions, im-
plementation has suffered; when a directive has been consistent with or
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strengthened current institutional arrangements, implementation has
been successful’ (Duina, 1997: 157). Thus the key idea of the concept is
that the higher the degree of convergence between a directive and the
national policy framework, the smoother the directive is transposed into
national law. Other research on Europeanization has pointed to the im-
portance of the similarity between EU and domestic projects and policies
in order to bring about change, too. Radaelli (2003) states that one out-
come of Europeanization can be ‘inertia, ( . . . ) a situation of lack of change.
This may (. . .) happen when a country finds that EU political architectures,
choices, models or policies are too dissimilar domestic practice. Inertia
may take the forms of ( . . . ) delays in the transposition of directives’
(Radaelli, 2003: 37). However, adaptational pressure also serves as a
motor for change: ‘When adaptational pressure is low, because of the con-
tent of EU policy is already present in a member state, there is no need to
change domestic institutions. Simply put, there is a good “fit” between
national policy and the European Union. ( . . . ) At the other extreme, when
the distance between EU policies and national ones is very high, member
states will it find difficult to ‘digest’ ( . . . ) European policy’ (Radaelli, 2003:
45) In other words, a ‘bad fit’ is the precondition for policy change. How-
ever, it also hinders the transposition of a European project on the domes-
tic level.
Further research has gradually extended and modified the goodness of
fit hypothesis. The concept has been expanded and several additional
variables have been introduced. Windhoff-Héritier, et al. (2001) has stated
that the capacity for change is influenced by formal veto positions (institu-
tions) and factual veto positions and supportive coalitions (contending
actors). She has conceived of the implementation of EU directives as a
policy process of goal-oriented actors in a given political context that may
restrict or facilitate implementation (Windhoff-Héritier, et al. 2001: 12).
Radaelli (2003) draws attention to the timing and argues that in field of
public policy the impact ‘( . . . ) of EU public policy is contingent on whether
a country is already involved in a process of reform or not’ (Radaelli, 2003:
47). As additional variables, he conceptualizes modes of legitimation and
supporting discourses.
Most importantly, research that has further developed the goodness of
fit approach has placed a special emphasis on the role of actors. Critical
accounts of the hypothesis have stressed that ‘“fit” is not a static given, but
rather depends on positions and perceptions of actors (Radaelli, 2003: 45).
From a “static” conception, focusing on the specific institutional arrange-
ments of a nation-state, the focus of the concept has been widened to
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actors who perceive a goodness of fit, and/or who use adaptational pres-
sures for promoting their policy aims (Börzel and Risse, 2003): ‘( . . . ) the
misfit between European and domestic processes, policies and institutions
provides ( . . . ) actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue
their interests’ (Börzel and Risse 2003: 58). Duina (2007), too, in a reply to
criticism on his original concept by Mastenbreoek and Kaeding (2006)
emphasizes the role of actors and holds that key actors can push a directive
despite misfit, or vice versa (Duina, 2007). He conceptualizes actors (state
officials and interest groups) as the link between goodness of fit and ease of
adaptation. Thus, both fit and actors matter (Duina, 2007).
Although the idea of “fit” was gradually made more complex and the
concept was expanded towards a more dynamic framework taking into
account various variables, some radical criticism has been formulated.
Thus Mastenbroek and Kaeding (2006), referring to a number of empirical
studies that contradict the goodness of fit hypothesis, have diagnosed its
‘disappointing empirical results’ (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006: 334)
and have come to the conclusion that the concept should be discarded.
They suggest concentrating on the domestic context and on domestic
actors’ preferences or beliefs in order to explain the implementation of
EU directives. However, in contrast to this view, I argue that goodness of
fit is a valuable approach in order to capture the dynamics of the Europea-
nization of German labour migration policies between 2010 and 2012.
３ The development of a common EU labour migration
policy
Much earlier than most of its member states and in particular Germany,
the European Union started attempts to develop a common European
labour migration policy. In 2000 which saw a Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community
Immigration Policy, a common EU labour migration policy was proposed
for the first time (Gsir, 2013: 94): ‘( . . . ) the Commission recalled that ( . . . )
emphasis was to be placed on the need to develop an immigration policy
designed to admit migrants mainly for economic reasons, as well as to
address demographic decline ( . . . ). This European discourse was different
from the dominant discourse of Member States in terms of programmatic
ideas and policy solutions at the national level’ (Gsir, 2013: 94). In 2001, the
EU, ‘presenting labour immigration as a solution to demographic problems
dramatically highlighted by the United Nations Population Division report’
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(Gsir, 2013: 94/95) presented a directive on labour migration. However it
was not accepted by the member states. In particular Germany and Austria
were against it. Still, in 2005, the European Commission published a “Green
paper” on an EU approach to Managing Economic Migration’, reasserting a
need for labour migration:
( . . . ) even if the Lisbon employment targets are met by 2010, overall employ-
ment levels will fall due to demographic change. Between 2010 and 2030, at
current immigration flows, the decline in the EU-25’s working age population
will entail a fall in the number of employed people of some 20 million. Such
developments will have a huge impact on overall economic growth, the func-
tioning of the internal market and the competitiveness of EU enterprises. ( . . . )
while immigration in itself is not a solution to demographic ageing, more
sustained immigration flows could increasingly be required to meet the needs
of the EU labour market and ensure Europe’s prosperity (European Commis-
sion, 2005).
Several other reports and communications on the EU level assessed the
importance of labour immigration and diagnosed a need because of de-
creasing fertility rates and demographic change:
( . . . ) In a context of an ageing Europe, the potential contribution of immigra-
tion to EU economic performance is significant (. . . ). According to the latest
population projections, by 2060, the working age population of the EU is pro-
jected to fall by almost 50 million even with continued net immigration similar
to historical levels and by around 110 million without such immigration. Such
evolutions present risks for the sustainability of pensions, health and social
protection systems and require increased public spending (European Commis-
sion, 2008).
Also, the EU’s positions on immigration correlated with its Lisbon Agenda
and the goal to become the world’s most competitive economy in 2010:
‘( . . . ) this [Blue Card] legislation aims to make Europe a player on the
emerging global labour market, enhancing its competitiveness and luring
highly skilled workers to Europe – and away from countries like the United
States and Australia’ (Collett, 2008).
In 2005, the policy plan on legal migration re-presented arguments for
labour migration. However, based on the failure of a comprehensive ap-
proach, in its policy proposals the European Commission opted for a sec-
toral approach, proposing three different directives. In 2007 the Blue Card
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directive was presented. The directive provided common rules on entry
and residence for highly-qualified workers and their families. Workers
who meet certain criteria (the existence of an employment offer or job
contract; higher professional qualifications; compliance with a minimum
salary threshold (at least 1.5 times the average of the gross annual salary of
the state) may take up an employment in any EU member state (Gonzalez
et al., 2013; von Weizsäcker, 2006). Although it was expected that the
approval of the directive would take place rather smoothly, in reality it
proved to be controversial. Especially Germany formulated doubts and
stressed that first national labour potential should be exhausted (Meyer,
2010). The admission criteria and salary threshold proposed by the EC also
raised controversy, and ‘( . . . ) a major opponent to the level proposed by the
Commission was Germany’ (Meyer, 2010: 22).
４ The evolution of German labour migration policies
between ２０００ and ２０１０: small changes, small effects
While during the negotiations of the Blue Card in Brussels some changes in
German labour migration policy took place, the German model still re-
mained rather restrictive, prioritizing the national work force: ‘Every uni-
versity graduate with a degree that is recognised in Germany can work in
Germany, if no national is available. That is the German immigration law
in one sentence’ (BMAS, 18.11.2011). This statement summarizes the basic
principle of the German labour migration policy until the year 2010, when
Germany was expected to transpose the EU Blue Card directive into na-
tional law. Despite some changes towards an opening of the labour market
for highly-skilled migrants, the German labour migration law represented a
demand-driven model based on a concrete job offer, and albeit with ex-
ceptions for a very narrow group of people, an overall restrictive frame-
work with a reluctance to create permanent settlement possibilities: ‘The
permanent settlement permit means that if the day after you got it you
become unemployed, you can work as a taxi driver. Then you can kill the
person who gave it to you, and you can still stay. It is as if you meet some-
body and you marry him on the same day, in a country that does not have
a divorce law. I would not do that’ (BMAS, 19.11.2011).
From the beginning of the 1970s until the year 2000, the country’s policy
on labour migration was guided by the principle of recruitment ban and
focused on preventing labour migration to Germany. Although since the
end of the 1980s channels for labour migration from outside the EU have
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existed, only temporary labour migration was admitted. The guiding prin-
ciple of “Germany is no immigration country” was not only reflected in the
lack of integration policies, but also in a restrictive framework on labour
migration, aiming, albeit with a few exceptions, at preventing labour mi-
gration to Germany. Until the passing of the first immigration law in 2005,
only channels for temporary labour migration into specific labour market
segments existed.
In 2005, a change in labour migration policies took place, and in the
following years the preconditions for the access to the German labour
market for highly-skilled migrants were gradually lowered. The ‘Law for
Managing and Containing Immigration and for the Regulation of the Re-
sidence and Integration of EU citizens and Foreigners’ (Gesetz zur Steuer-
ung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts
und der Integration von Unionsbürgern) for the first time established chan-
nels for permanent labour immigration that were conceptualized as a
regular option and not as an exception. Specific channels for the access of
highly-skilled migrants to the labour market were created. This group
could now obtain a permanent settlement permit. However, a high salary
threshold (86,400 Euro) for taking up employment in Germany still re-
stricted the immigration of highly-skilled migrants. Also, the new immigra-
tion law maintained the principle of a general recruitment stop.
In 2007 and 2009, further legal and administrative changes took place
that liberalized the channels for highly-skilled migration. The Law for the
management of labour migration that came into force on 1. January 2009
lowered the required minimum income for highly-skilled migrants under
paragraph 19 from 86,400 to 63,600 Euro.３ However, the legal provisions for
highly-skilled migration had more a symbolic than a material effect. Be-
tween 2007 and 2011, less than one-thousand migrants used the paragraph
19 to take up employment in Germany.
All in all, until the transposition of the Blue Card directive, the overall
framework remained restrictive and prioritized the national workforce.
Changes towards a more open labour migration regime still took place
within a system whose main feature was a conditional labour market
access for third-state migrants. Apart from those using the legal channel
for highly-skilled migrants, all labour migrants were subjected to the so-
called priority check (Vorrangprüfung) that is carried out on a case-by-case
basis for each single job application. In this process, the Federal Employ-
ment Agency and the foreigner’s office examine if a national or an EU
citizen is available for the job. Citizens from outside the EU can only take
up the position if no national worker is available.
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５ The transposition of the EU Blue Card directive into
German law: conflicts and opportunities
However, during the phase of the transposition of the Blue Card directive,
the restrictive German framework was more and more challenged by some
government actors and a new discourse that centered on Germany’s need
to remain economically competitive. The transposition of the Blue Card
directive was supposed to take place in December 2010, in the context of
the transposition of several EU directives, i.e. the returns directive and the
employer sanctions directive. A law project comprising the three directives
had been prepared by the Ministry of the Interior at the end of 2009.
However, in 2010 the Blue Card directive was taken out again of the second
Directives Implementation Law (Zweites Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz)
(Basse et al., 2011). ‘Against the background of public debates on skilled
labour, and debates on the topic within the governing coalition, the direc-
tive on highly-skilled migrants was excluded from the law project’ (Basse et
al., 2011: 363). The reason lay in conflicts within the government, and the
opposition of the Bavarian conservative CSU against the EU Blue Card
(BMI, 22.11.2013). One reason given by the CSU for its opposition was the
fear that the realization of the full freedom of movement for the EU acces-
sion countries in May 2011 would lead to a high amount of immigrants
from these countries (BMI, 22.11.2013). The CSU also embedded its position
in a discourse generally critical of non-EU foreigners. In September 2010 its
chairman stated that ‘Germany is not an immigration country’. Also, he
explicitly positioned himself against a points-based system and against the
introduction of quotas for certain sectors or professions. He demanded
that the evaluation procedure of requests for residence permits should
not only evaluate the qualification of the potential labour migrant, but
also his or her ‘willingness to integrate’ (Die Welt, 16.10. 2010). On the
opposite side, the liberal party FDP was against the transposition of the
directive in the form foreseen by the legal project, arguing that the Blue
Card directive should be used for the introduction of a more comprehen-
sive labour migration framework. Thus for very different reasons, both
smaller coalition partners opposed transposing the directive at this point.
５.１ A changing discourse on labour migration
However, while the transposition of the Blue Card directive became the
object of a controversial debate within the government, the public discus-
sion about a need for foreign skilled labour intensified. Since the year 2010,
various actors have diagnosed the so-called Fachkräftemangel, a shortage
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of skilled labour, and it has become a topic of growing importance both in
the media coverage and in the political sphere. A number of studies and
expert reports were published on the issue, and interest groups increas-
ingly brought the subject into the public sphere. National actors, such as
the Association of German Engineers (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure) and the
Federal Association of Information Services, Telecommunication and New
Media (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und
neue Medien e.V. (Bitkom)) issued reports stating that their sectors lacked
several tens of thousands of qualified workers. Regional actors, too, pub-
lished figures on labour shortages. The Chamber of Commerce of Stuttgart
declared that in 2014, up to 85,000 skilled workers would be lacking in
Baden-Württemberg (IHK Region Stuttgart, 2011). The Bavarian economic
association (Vereinigung der bayerischen Wirtschaft) identified a lack of
more than 500,000 qualified workers that in 2030 would increase to more
than one million (Scharnitzky, 2011). In the same vain, the Cologne Insti-
tute for Economic Research (Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln) calcu-
lated that in 2020 the shortage in the so-called MINT４ professions would
amount to 426,000. Also, a number of government bodies and research
institutions published projections on the future development of the Ger-
man work force and figures on the immigration level needed to compen-
sate losses due to demographic change. According to the German Institute
for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) Ger-
many needed a net immigration of 500,000 per year in order to secure its
economic force (Newsletter Migration und Bevölkerung, 2010). In February
2011 the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) published
a report on the ongoing Fachkräftemangel. stating that Germany needed to
establish a “welcoming culture” and that a short-term immigration of 0.4
million to 0.8 million foreign workers would be necessary (Bundesagentur
für Arbeit, 2011). Actors such as the Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftun-
gen für Integration und Migration, an expert body founded by several foun-
dations, elaborated a projection on the future evolution of the German
work force. According to this calculation, without any immigration, be-
tween 2008 and 2060 the labour force would decrease by 373,000 per year;
with a medium-level immigration, it would decrease by 313,000 and with a
high level of immigration (plus 200,000 yearly, starting in the year 2020), by
247,000 (SVR, 2011: 44).
At the same time, a consensual discourse emerged that acknowledged
Germany’s need for labour migration. Although positions on which instru-
ments should be introduced sometimes widely differed, key state and non-
state actors all agreed that Germany needed a “welcoming culture” and hat
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to successfully participate in the ongoing “global competition for the
brightest minds”: ‘The competition for the brightest minds is intensifying
( . . . ) Especially regarding the establishment of a welcoming culture, many
things need to be done. Where can the accompanying spouse work, where
are schools for the children, these are important questions for migrants.
( . . . ). At the universities, for scientists, these issues are already well-taken
care of, but in the economic sector, much remains to be done’ (BMI 1,
17.11.2011). ‘German companies are part of a global competition for the
brightest minds ( . . .). It is clear that we need qualified workers in order to
secure our welfare in the global competition’ (Bundesministerium für
Arbeit und Soziales, 2010): ‘If you have a look at the EU, the competition
for the brightest minds is in full process, and we are already lagging behind
because we have lost the first immigration waves from the EU 8, others
have been faster’ (BDA, 17.11.2011).
５.２ Controversies and pro-liberalization positions within the
federal government
The preparation of the transposition of the EU Blue card into German law
took place during a time when a new dynamic in the political and public
negotiation of German labour migration policies developed. The debate
was characterized by attempts of part of the governing coalition to signifi-
cantly liberalize the existing labour migration framework, and ensuing
conflicts both within and between the governing parties. The controversy
centered on the preconditions that should be attached to the granting of a
settlement permit to highly-skilled migrants.
At the end of 2010 a controversy started between the governing parties
CDU/CSU on one side and the FDP on the other side (Höll and Öchsner,
2010). The liberal party FDP wanted to lower the income threshold for
highly-qualified migrants. The liberal minister of justice criticized its coali-
tion partner: ‘The reluctance of the CDU to tackle the issue of labour
migration management is not proof of a rational immigration policy’
(Preuß, 2011b). ‘Who do we want to invite to Germany? Who can be a
motor for our society? (. . . ) Currently Germany is losing in the competition
for the brightest minds’. Within the CDU, opposing positions on the issue
existed. Both the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Science de-
manded, against the positions of their own party faction in the Bundestag,
the introduction of a points-based system and a lower income threshold
for the highly-qualified. The CDU/CSU faction of the Bundestag and the
CDU Minister of Interior were against these plans (Preuß, 2011a).
Another factor that influenced the debate on the liberalization of labour
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migration was the issue of freedom of movement for citizens of the new
2007 accession countries. Germany had restricted the freedom of move-
ment of citizens from these countries until the 01.05.2011. An important
argument of those actors with a restrictive position was the “fear” of a
mass immigration after the opening towards the EU-8. After the establish-
ment of the full freedom of movement in May 2011, however, immigration
numbers remained low. Key labour migration actors agree that these low
immigration numbers helped to bring about the change towards a less
restrictive labour migration model (BDA, 17.11.2011; BMI 2, 2.04.2012; SMI 1,
7.07.2012; SMA, 21.07.2012):
The first May 2011 certainly demystified the issue ( . . . ) In fact everybody knows
that Germany is not a country where qualified foreigners are queuing up and
where we just have to open the borders and masses will stream in. And one has
seen that now at the opening for the EU-8. The low immigration figures from
the new EU member states have brought a new dynamic into the debate,
making it easier for the government to adopt a more liberal approach, since
fears of being “overrun” have not been justified. (BMAS, 9.02.2012)
Also, the favourable economic situation and the comparatively low unem-
ployment figures served as a window of opportunity for change: ‘The
labour market situation has considerably changed during the last two
years. We have much less unemployed people. And the need for migration
depends on the labour market’ (CDU/CSU, 10.02.2012).
Finally, those parts of the government who were in favour of a more
open labour migration policy gradually were successful. In June 2011, on
the initiative of the Christian-Democratic Minister of Labour, the govern-
ment issued a so-called positive list of professions (Positivliste) that would
not be subject to the priority check anymore. The list included mechan-
ical engineers, electronic engineers and doctors. ５ On 6 November 2011,
the government agreed to yet again reform paragraph 19 Residence Law
and to lower the required minimum income for university graduates to
48,000 Euro.
５.３ The Länder as actors in labour migration policy
During the negotiation of a new labour migration framework and during
the phase in which the transposition of the EU Blue Card directive was
discussed, the position of the representation of the German Länder chan-
ged from a restrictive position towards demands for a significant liberal-
ization of the German labour migration regime. In the German political
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system, the representation of the Länder has several competences in the
political process. Legislative projects by the federal government must be
first presented to the Bundesrat; also, it can introduce its own legislative
projects. The Bundesrat must approve those laws that have a direct effect
on the financial or administrative structure of the Länder. It can veto all
other laws; however, this veto can be overridden by the national parlia-
ment. In 2007, confronted with the proposal on the EU Blue Card directive,
it had rejected the idea of a common residence title: ‘The Bundesrat de-
mands to ensure that the principle of subsidiarity is upheld and stresses
( . . . ) the competencies of the member states to regulate the access to their
national labour markets ( . . . )’ (Bundesrat, 2007). It also rejected the idea to
allow immigration based on compliance with a minimum salary threshold.
However, in the following years, the representation of the German re-
gions gradually changed its position. One of the first and most active actors
who demanded better and more generous immigration channels for skilled
labour was the free state of Saxony. Saxony is an instance of an Eastern
German federal state where since the reunification the population has
rapidly decreased, and where at the same time a significant economic
growth is taking place. Since 1990, the population has decreased by 15
percent, and projections show that until 2025, it will decrease by another
12 percent. In 2014, more people will leave the employment sector than will
take up an employment. Due to historical reasons, Saxony has a specific,
non-EU migration profile. While in the western federal states a tradition of
intra-EU labour migration from Italy and Spain exists that encourages new
migration from these countries, the Eastern German Länder’s historical
migration ties with Eastern European countries who until recently have
not been in the EU, or who still are not EU members. The main countries of
origin of migrants living in Saxony are Vietnam, Russia, Ukraine and
Poland (Landtag Sachsen, n.d.).
Confronted with the pressure of a lack of skilled workers and the danger
of companies not expanding because of this situation, in 2008 the govern-
ment of Saxony defined and established a new policy field, “Gaining by
migration” (Zugewinn durch Zuwanderung), and set up a corresponding
department in the Ministry of Interior. The existing legal provisions for
the immigration of skilled labour were considered to be ineffective: ‘The
law of 2005 was useless because the salary threshold was too high’ (SMI 1,
7.07.2012). In 2009, Saxony commissioned a study on the future of labour
migration by the research institute Institut der Zukunft der Arbeit (IZA).
The study recommended the introduction of a system with a yearly quota
for immigration, combined with a points system that would take into
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account qualification, language skills and professional experience (Hinte et
al., 2011). In April 2011 the federal state of Saxony brought an initiative
based on the IZA report to the Bundesrat. Although also governed by the
CDU, the proposition of Saxony was contrary to the position of the federal
government and of the CDU on the federal level. However, ‘( . . . ) that is
federalism for you. The interests of the region overpowers party interests’
(SMA, 21.07.2012).
The Blue Card directive both provided a “blueprint” for the initiative of
the Saxon government and helped to draw attention to Saxony’s initiative.
One motive to introduce the Bundesrat initiative was that the Blue Card
directive was not being transposed (SMI, 17.07.2012): ‘We have built our
Bundesrat initiative knowing the Blue Card directive, and we have adapted
elements of the Blue Card directive’ (SMI, 17.07.2012). However, at first
Saxony could not find allies for its proposal amongst other regions. In this
situation, the Blue Card directive served as an opportunity for underlining
the demands of the Saxon government ‘The EU initiative helped us (. . .). In
the context of its negotiation, we could draw attention again to our initia-
tive in the Bundesrat’ (SMA 21.07.2012). When Germany was lagging behind
with the transposition, the directive became a “catalyst” (SMI, 17.07.2012).
Gradually, other federal states also developed positions in favour of a
more open labour migration regime. In December 2011 the conference of
the ministers of economy of the 16 Länder demanded a paradigm change in
labour migration policy, towards a welcoming culture and the attraction of
skilled foreign workers (Beschluss der Wirtschaftsministerkonferenz, 2011).
Hamburg established a welcome centre for labour migrants at its aliens’
office. ‘Between 2007 and 2012, it became widely accepted that we will be
confronted with a lack of skilled workers that cannot be addressed by the
national workforce or solely by EU labour migrants. It took the Länder a bit
longer to realize this, but they did’ (BMI, 3 24.02.2014). 2012, in its note on
the federal government’s Blue Card legislative project, the Bundesrat had,
compared to 2007, significantly changed its position on the Blue Card. It
‘explicitly welcomed the introduction of the Blue Card’ and demanded
even more far-reaching changes than the Blue Card directive contained.
The Bundesrat proposed to allow labour immigration of migrants who are
not university graduates but who have a comparable five years professional
experience. It also suggested the introduction of a skills-based labour im-
migration channel, namely the introduction of a ‘job search visa’, a propo-
sition that was taken up by the federal government when it transposed the
Blue Card directive (Bundesrat, 2012).
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５.４ The transposition of the Blue Card directive
In December 2011 the federal government decided on a draft legislation
transposing the EU Blue Card directive into German law. In March 2012 it
announced that it had come to an agreement on the way of transposing
the Blue Card directive, and on the further measures that would accom-
pany the introduction of the Blue Card. ‘Basically the Blue Card directive
only provided a general framework, and it was up to the national govern-
ments to decide on how attractive they would make this new residence
title for highly-skilled migrants. For us, the EU directive was an opportu-
nity. We wanted to lower the minimum income threshold anyway (. . . )’
(BMI 3, 24.02.2014). At the time of the transposition of the directive, the
existing national legal provisions regarding the required minimum salary
for highly-skilled migration were already almost identical to the provisions
of the Blue Card: ‘It was the national decision-making process that was
decisive for the introduction of the Blue Card’ (BMI 3, 24.02.2014). The Blue
Card directive served as a “vehicle” (BMI, 24.02.2014; SMI 2, 01.03.2014) for
bringing about a policy change that already was intended by the federal
government.
In August 2012, the law on the transposition of the EU directive on
highly-skilled migration (Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Hochqualifizierten-
Richtlinie der Europäischen Union) came into force. With it, the federal
government agreed on a new legal framework with far-reaching conse-
quences for the German labour migration regime. The EU Blue Card that
was introduced became a new residence title, replacing paragraph 19 of the
Residence Act. The Blue Card can be granted to university graduates from
outside the EU who earn more than 44,800 Euro/year. For the MINT pro-
fessions, the required minimum income is set at 34,900 Euro. In its trans-
position, the German government lowered the minimum salary threshold
as far as it is made possible by the Blue Card directive. Also, the German
transposition foresees the shortest time frame for processing the Blue Card
(14 days) (Kosc, 2013: 8).6 As opposed to the regulations of the former
paragraph 19 Residence Act, holders of the Blue Card at first only get a
temporary residence title. This can be viewed as a concession to the Bavar-
ian CSU and parts of the CDU. After three years of continuous employment
in Germany, however, the residence title can be transformed into a perma-
nent settlement permit. Blue Card holders with very good German lan-
guage skills may be granted a permanent settlement permit after two
years. Another new regulation that was introduced with the Blue Card
transposition is a so-called job search visa. It gives university graduates
from every country in the world the possibility to obtain a six-month visa
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for a job search in Germany. The introduction of this instrument was
suggested by the Bundesrat and taken up by the federal government. The
only precondition is that they can prove that they have the financial means
to sustain themselves during their stay in Germany. The introduction of
this instrument as §18c into the new immigration act introduces a human
capital based instrument, up until now associated with Canada and the
USA, into the previously solely employment-driven German system (Kolb,
2014b). This represents not only a departure from the long prevailing phi-
losophy that labour immigration to Germany was only possible with a
work contract. It also means that in fact a very basic points system consist-
ing of two accession criteria, i.e. an academic qualification and adequate
means of subsistence during the stay in Germany, was introduced into the
German labour migration regime (Kolb, 2014b: 66).
Furthermore, the law also abolishes the regulation of paragraph 19 Re-
sidence Act according to which self-employed foreigners must invest
250,000 Euro and create five jobs in order to obtain a settlement permit
in Germany. Finally, the legislation also entails a change for foreign stu-
dents. From now on, foreign university graduates may take up any job
during the “search year” in which they are entitled to look for an employ-
ment in Germany (and not only if it is considered to be corresponding to
their degree of qualification). After having been employed for two years,
they can be granted a permanent settlement permit. Also, foreigners who
have been doing their vocational training in Germany may take up em-
ployment in Germany after their training.
６ Conclusion: Preconditions for the Europeanization of
German labour migration policy
With the transposition of the EU Blue Card directive, the German labour
migration regime has been significantly liberalized and has undergone a
paradigm change. By lowering the salary threshold for taking up employ-
ment in Germany as far as made possible by the Blue Card directive, the
concept of “highly-qualified” was redefined and now means migrants with
a salary that is only slightly higher than the national average gross salary.
Furthermore, with the transposition, a skills-based, offer-oriented labour
migration instrument was introduced into the up until now exclusively
demand-oriented German legal framework. The reform significantly in-
creases the possibility of access of third-state migrants to the German
labour market. In fact, in European comparison, in 2012 Germany was the
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country that had issued the highest amount of Blue Cards in the EU (2584),
thus having delivered 86 percent of all Blue Cards (Kosc, 2013: 15).
This transposition of the Blue Card directive must be seen as the final
point of a national development towards a more open labour migration
regime. Since 2010, the debate about the need for skilled foreign labour
gained momentum. In 2010, at the time when Blue Card directive was
supposed to be implemented, a controversial debate on labour migration
took place. Ultimately, those actors who were in favour of a further open-
ing of the German labour market to third-state migrants were successful.
Both key actors on the federal level and at the subnational level demanded
a liberalization of the German migration law. At the same time, a public
discourse on Germany’s need to remain internationally competitive inten-
sified, strongly mirroring the discourse on labour migration at the EU level.
In the German case, some actors used the Blue Card directive as an oppor-
tunity for promoting their ideas. However, at the same time, and maybe
more importantly, a development towards a convergence of political dis-
courses and policy goals between the EU and the German political context
took place. The directive was transposed when the policy preferences by
national key actors and the domestic discourse on the subject had become
almost identical with the content of the Blue Card directive. Then not only
the directive was transposed; rather, EU legislation was used to bring about
a major policy change that represents a paradigmatic shift in German
labour migration policy. In an internationally comparative perspective,
regarding its management of labour migration Germany has changed
from a ‘restrictive maverick to a liberal role model’ (Kolb, 2014a: 91). With
the most recent reforms, a rapid policy change in German labour migration
policy has taken place: ‘After many years of a reluctant position towards
labour migration at best, Germany since 2012 has introduced immigration
channels that in an internationally comparative perspective are liberal and
open’ (SVR, 2014: 15). The German development also fits into a general
international trend towards hybrid models of labour migration regulation
that combine both employer-based and human-capital oriented instru-
ments (Kolb, 2014a; Papademetriou and Sumption, 2011). Austria, which
in the negotiation of the Blue Card on the EU level also took a sceptic
stance, in 2011 introduced a human capital based approach, too. The Rot-
Weiß-Rote Karte is a points system for highly-qualified workers and work-
ers in shortage professions. With the red-white-red card, highly-skilled
migrants can obtain a six month visa to look for employment in Austria.
In order to understand the rapid and paradigmatic change in German
labour migration policy, this article has discussed the concept of goodness
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of fit with the aim of evaluating how valuable the approach still is for
understanding processes of Europeanization and the impact of the EU
level on the domestic context. The case of the German Blue Card transpo-
sition confirms two of the central hypothesis of the goodness of fit ap-
proach: that directives are smoothly transposed if they fit the domestic
institutions and policies; and that actors perceive and use an EU legal
project for promoting their ideas. The German case shows that “goodness
of fit” can (or should) be understood as a process rather than a static
concept: as a precondition for the transposition, EU and domestic policy
aims first had to reach a degree of conformity. Then, this “good fit” encour-
aged a significant policy change in the field of German migration policies,
even transcending the aims of the EU directive. Thus, the German case
shows that an EU directive can also be a vehicle for a broader policy
change. It is another instance of how a government seeking reform uses
the European level (Radaelli, 2003). However, it is also worth noting that
an emphasis on a low degree of (intra-EU) migration (the low immigration
rates after the establishment of the freedom of movement for the 2004
accession countries in 2011) served as an important precondition for the
opening of the German labour migration regime.
The case of the German Blue Card transposition shows that the concept
of goodness of fit, understood as a framework for understanding the inter-
action and the interdependency of the EU and the national level, still is a
useful concept that should not be discarded. Focusing exclusively, as some
authors have proposed, on the national context for understanding the
impact of European politics and policies on the domestic level, would
mean a return to a methodological nationalism that would block the view
for the processes of multi-level governance that undoubtedly take place in
the field of European labour migration. All in all, the case of the German
Blue Card transposition provides a valuable instance to understand pro-
cesses of Europeanization, from a policy field hitherto comparatively ne-
glected by Europeanization research.
Notes
1 . Three interviews took place with representatives of the Ministry of the Interior: one
interview with a civil servant of the unit immigration law (BMI 1) and two interviews
with the head of the unit immigration law (BMI 2 and BMI 3).
2. Most of this empirical material was generated in the framework of the research project
“Labour Migration Governance in Contemporary Europe” (2012 to 2014), directed by Dr.
Ferruccio Pastore, FIERI, Torino and has also been presented in Laubenthal (2012).
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3. Now the salary had to at least correspond to the income threshold to the pension
insurance scheme. In 2012, the income threshold to the pension insurance scheme
was at 67,200 Euro/year in Western Germany and at 57,600 Euro in Eastern Germany.
4. Mathematics, information technology, natural sciences, technology.
5. It is however interesting to note that the already existing law would have permitted the
same, too: professions could have been exempted from the priority check by applying
paragraph 39 (2) Residence Act which states that the Federal Employment Agency of
Labour can agree to the issuing of a residence permit under paragraph 18 if this appears
to be necessary for certain professions or economic sectors.
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